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NOTE
A PENNY FOR YOUR THOUGHTS:
REVISITING COMMONWEALTH V. POWER
I. INTRODUCTION
"True crime" stories such as the tales of Tonya Harding or Amy
Fisher are among today's hottest selling television shows, movies, and
books.1 Although the thought of such unscrupulous characters making
money by talking about their crimes is repugnant, it is a fact of life in
today's mass communications "marketplace of ideas." Indeed, a very
premise of the First Amendment is that we benefit from a vigorous
marketplace of ideas, and that society is diminished when any voice is
stilled by government. 2
This Note addresses the growing dispute among lower courts
regarding the extent to which those convicted of a crime may be subjected
to otherwise unconstitutional restrictions on fundamental rights.
Specifically, this Note explores whether a court-imposed condition of
probation prohibiting a convicted criminal from profiting from the sale of
her "story" is constitutionally permissible or if the condition violates a
probationer's right to freedom of expression. This Note will focus on
Commonwealth v. Power,3 in which the Supreme Judicial Court of
1. See A.J. Jacobs, Where Are They Now?, ENT. WKLY., Oct. 21, 1994, at 8 ("After the
[Nancy] Kerrigan-Tonya Harding debacle, nearly 40 producers clamored for rights to
Kerrigan's story."). In fact, the Amy Fisher story was so lurid (i.e. marketable), that three
television networks each aired different docudramas dedicated to the subject within the same
week. Lee Margulies, TV Ratings; ABC's 'Fisher' Is King, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1993, at F2.
Similarly, the HBO movie detailing the life of the Texas Cheerleader-Murdering Mom was
critically acclaimed and received numerous awards. See Howard Rosenberg, 'Cheerleading-
Murdering Mom': Three Semi-Cheers, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1993, at FI; Nighttime Nominees: A
Complete Rundown, L.A. TIMES, July 23, 1993, at F26.
2. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ("If there is a bedrock principle
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an
idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."); FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1978) ("[T]he fact that society may find speech offensive is
not a sufficient reason for suppressing it .... For it is a central tenet of the First Amendment
that the government must remain neutral in the marketplace of ideas.").
3. 650 N.E.2d 87 (Mass. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 697 (1996).
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Massachusetts upheld such a restriction on the basis that it reinforced the
"moral foundations of our society."'4 Relying upon this rationale, the
Massachusetts court employed the same reasoning that has often motivated
government censors: a desire to shape public opinion by targeting and
burdening disfavored speakers.5  In her appeal to the United States
Supreme Court, Katherine Ann Power challenged the legitimacy of such
speech restrictions and questioned the standard of review.6 Ultimately,
however, her appeal was denied 7 and the question of the appropriate
standard of review remains unresolved.
Part II of this Note sketches the events surrounding Katherine Ann
Power's crime and her years as a fugitive. Part III outlines the purposes of
probation. Part IV addresses the growing conflict among the lower courts
as to the appropriate standard of review for court-imposed probation
conditions that curtail a probationer's fundamental rights. Part V suggests
that an intermediate standard of review, with an appropriate nexus between
the character of the violation and the structure of the restriction, is required
when probation conditions restrict an individual's fundamental First
Amendment liberties. Such a standard would properly protect speech
rights without elevating the status of probationers to that of the general
public. Finally, Part VI concludes that the conditions imposed on Power
would not survive judicial scrutiny under an intermediate standard of
review; and therefore, these conditions impermissibly restrict her freedom
of expression.
4. Id. at 91. This topic has been explored by others, most notably by Shaun B. Spencer.
See Shaun B. Spencer, Note, Does Crime Pay-Can Probation Stop Katherine Ann Power from
Selling Her Story?, 35 B.C. L. REv. 1203 (1994). Spencer suggests that the probation condition
placed on Power violated her freedom of expression because the condition was not necessary to
either of the permissible purposes of probation. Id. at 1233-35. The restriction neither helps
rehabilitate Power nor protects the public from her recidivism. Id. This Note seeks to build on
that critique. Spencer's analysis omits a discussion of possible doctrinal developments that
would alleviate the conflict among lower courts as to the appropriate standard of review for such
probation conditions. More specifically, this Note seeks to demonstrate support for an
intermediate standard of review. Such a standard would properly protect First Amendment
speech rights without elevating the status of probationers to that of non-probationers.
Moreover, precisely because judicial orders direct their commands toward particular
individuals, injunctions restraining speech are inherently suspect and therefore deserve a higher
level of scrutiny. See infra Part V.
5. See discussion infra Part V.
6. See Petition for Cert. at 6, Commonwealth v. Power, 650 N.E.2d 87 (Mass. 1995), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 697 (1996).
7. Power v. Massachusetts, 116 S. Ct. 697 (1996).
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II. THE STORY ITSELF
Like many college students in the late 1960s and early 1970s,
Katherine Ann Power found herself in the midst of student activism.8
Power initially became active in the student movement while attending
Brandeis University in Massachusetts. 9 A National Merit Scholarship
finalist and youth columnist for the Denver Post, Power appeared "primed
for academic success."10  Stemming from her experience at a Roman
Catholic girls' school, where social justice was a significant part of the
curriculum, Power became increasingly energized by the growing student
protest movement on campus."l
In the spring of 1970, after President Richard Nixon sent troops to
Cambodia, four Kent State student protesters were gunned down by the
National Guard. 12 These events appear to have galvanized Power; she
became a central figure in the National Student Strike Force, a
clearinghouse for information about student strikes all over the country. 13
At Brandeis, Power met the four individuals who would later become
her accomplices in a local bank robbery designed to further their efforts in
support of the Black Panthers. 14 Stanley Bond, the alleged mastermind of
the bank robbery, was participating in a program at Brandeis designed to
provide college educations to former prison inmates. 15 Joining in the
robbery were Robert Valeri 16 and William Gilday, 17 whom Bond had met
in prison, as well as Susan Saxe, Power's college roommate. 18
On September 23, 1970, in the Brighton area of Boston,
Massachusetts, Bond, Saxe, and Valeri robbed the State Street Bank. 19
Power waited in the switch car about a half mile from the bank.20 Outside
the bank, Power's fourth accomplice William Gilday was parked in the
8. See Margaret Carlson, The Return of the Fugitive, TIME, Sept. 27, 1993, at 60.
9. See Barbara Kantrowitz et al., The Fugitive, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 27, 1993, at 56.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See Carlson, supra note 8, at 61.
13. Kantrowitz, supra note 9, at 56.
14. Id. at 56-57. The Black Panthers were a militant Black Power organization founded in
the 1960s by Huey Newton and others.
15. Id. at 57.
16. Id.
17. Carlson, supra note 8, at 61.
18. Id.
19. Kantrowitz, supra note 9, at 55.
20. Id. at 56.
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getaway car.21 When Boston Police Officer Walter Schroeder arrived at
the scene, Gilday fired a submachine gun, fatally wounding Officer
Schroeder in the back.22 Although Gilday pulled the trigger, under
Massachusetts law, all participants involved in a felony where a victim is
killed may be charged with murder.
23
Soon after, police caught three of Power's accomplices. 24 Gilday, the
gunman, was convicted of murder and sentenced to life in prison.25 Valeri
helped convict Bond and Gilday when he testified against them for the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 26 The mastermind of the scheme,
Bond, attempted to blast his way out of prison while awaiting trial. 27 To
the defeat of prosecutors, the bomb exploded and killed him.28 Although
both Power and Saxe went underground together, Saxe was eventually
caught in 1975.29 Saxe served seven years in prison for her part in the
robbery, and now works for a charitable organization in Philadelphia.30
Power, however, continued to elude the police.31 She remained on
the FBI's ten-most-wanted list for fourteen years.32 With no fruitful leads,
the FBI dropped her from the list in 1984. 33 After hiding out in women's
communes for several years,34 Power moved with her young son to
Oregon's Willamette Valley.35 Appropriating the name of an infant who
died the year she was born, Katherine Ann Power became 'Alice
Metzinger.' 36 After marrying Ronley Duncan,37 'Alice' served as a
restaurant consultant and later opened her own restaurant in Eugene,
21. Carlson, supra note 8, at 61.
22. Id.
23. See Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 560 N.E.2d 698, 700 (Mass. 1990) (felony murder rule
imposes criminal liability for homicide on all participants in a felony that results in death).
24. Commonwealth v. Power, 650 N.E.2d 87, 88 (Mass. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 697
(1996).
25. Carlson, supra note 8, at 61.
26. Kantrowitz, supra note 9, at 57.
27. Carlson, supra note 8, at 62.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 60.
32. Id.
33. See Carlson, supra note 8, at 60.
34. Kantrowitz, supra note 9, at 57.
35. Carlson, supra note 8, at 61.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 61-62.
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Oregon. 38 In addition, she became active in the community, teaching
nutrition classes at a local college.
39
Notwithstanding her many accomplishments, Power became
alarmingly depressed. 40 She consulted with a therapist who helped her
realize "that her emotional difficulties would never end until she gave up
her life as a fugitive."
41
On September 15, 1993, under the glare of the national news media,
Power surrendered to Boston police.42 Represented by counsel, Power
pleaded guilty in Boston's Suffolk County Superior Court to two counts of
armed robbery and one count of manslaughter.43 On October 6, 1993, the
trial court sentenced Power to concurrent eight to twelve-year prison terms
on the manslaughter and armed robbery charges, consistent with the
prosecutor's recommendation. 44 Beyond the terms set forth in the plea
agreement, the court also placed Power on probation for twenty years, with
the probation and prison terms to run concurrently.
45
In addition to her terms of incarceration and probation, the court
added a special condition of probation, the central focus of this Note, to
apply throughout Power's prison term and her twenty-year probation
term. 46 The court expressly prohibited Power "from directly or indirectly
38. Kantrowitz, supra note 9, at 58.
39. Id.
40. Carlson, supra note 8, at 60-61.
41. Kantrowitz, supra note 9, at 58.
42. Commonwealth v. Power, 650 N.E.2d 87, 88 (Mass. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 697
(1996).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 89.
45. Id.
46. Id. Critics contend that Power's acceptance of the sentence constitutes consent to the
probation conditions under either of three theories of probation: (1) "act of grace" or "contract;"
(2) "constructive custody;" or (3) falling within an administrative search exception. See
Cathryn Jo Rosen, The Fourth Amendment Implications of Urine Testing for Evidence of Drug
Use in Probation, 55 BROOK. L. REv. 1159, 1192-96 (1990).
Under the "act of grace" theory, a probationer impliedly consents to a state's "act of
grace," an offer of probation in lieu of prison. Id. at 1194. However, in Gagnon v. Scarpelli,
the Supreme Court rejected this theory, stating that courts may not rely on the "act of grace"
theory to deny probationers due process. 411 U.S. 778, 782 n.4 (1973).
The "contract" theory of probation is an expanded version of the "act of grace" theory.
Under this theory, the decision to grant probation is an offer of freedom from imprisonment, in
consideration for which the probationer agrees to obey the terms of the probation. See Rosen,
supra, at 1194. However, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has similarly rejected
this theory of probation. See Commonwealth v. LaFrance, 525 N.E.2d 379, 381 n.3 (Mass.
1988). Thus, Power's acceptance of her sentence does not constitute consent. See Gagnon, 411
U.S. at 782 n.4; LaFrance, 525 N.E.2d at 381 n.3; Rosen, supra, at 1194. Under the
"constructive custody" theory, the imposition of a penal sentence implicitly places the offender
1996]
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engaging in any profit or benefit generating activity relating to ... the
criminal acts for which [she was] convicted. '47 Any violation of this
condition could subject Power to life imprisonment.
48
On November 24, 1993, Power was sentenced in federal court to a
five-year prison term to be served concurrently with her eight to twelve-
year state prison term. 49 The federal court also imposed a $10,000 fine
and, ironically, encouraged Power to engage in remunerative activity and
to share the proceeds of her story with Officer Schroeder's family.
50
Power expressed a willingness to do so, but was unable, given the
probation conditions imposed by the state court. 51
Power appealed the probation conditions, asserting that the speech
restrictions, as drafted, violate the First Amendment. 52 The Supreme
within the custody of the penal system. Rosen, supra, at 1193. Accordingly, the argument goes,
an offender is entitled to no more rights than a prisoner could enjoy. Id. However, the rationale
for this theory is based on the compelling needs of correctional institutions to maintain security
and discipline, goals that are not applicable in non-institutional environments. Id. Thus, as this
theory is based on a legal fiction, it allows courts to avoid consideration of important policy
issues. Id. These arguments supported the Supreme Court's rejection of the "constructive
custody" theory in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 483 (1972).
Finally, the administrative search theory suggests that any individual convicted of a
criminal act is subject to any reasonable search done in the state's administrative capacity. See
Rosen, supra, at 1195-96. Implicit in this approach is a balancing act between the state's valid
interests and the probationer's right to liberty. Id. This Note pursues this line of argument.
47. Power, 650 N.E.2d at 89. The Massachusetts Department of Probation, responsible for
monitoring probationers' activities, articulated the court's order:
You, your assignees and your representatives acting on your authority are
prohibited from directly or indirectly engaging in any profit or benefit generating
activity relating to the publication of facts or circumstances pertaining to your
involvement in the criminal acts for which you stand convicted (including
contracting with any person, firm, corporation, partnership, association or other
legal entity with respect to the commission and/or reenactment of your crimes, by
way of a movie, book, magazine article, tape recording, phonograph record, radio
or television presentations, live entertainment of any kind, or from the expression
of your thoughts, feelings, opinions or emotions regarding such crime). This
prohibition includes those events undertaken and experienced by you while
avoiding apprehension from the authorities. Any action taken by you whether by
way of execution of power of attorney, creation of corporate entities or like action
to avoid compliance with this condition of probation will be considered a violation
of probation conditions.
Id.
48. Brief for Appellant at 1, Commonwealth v. Power, 650 N.E.2d 87 (Mass. 1995) (No.
93-P-1755), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 697 (1996).
49. Christopher B. Daly, Radical Fugitive Gets Fine But No More Prison Time, WASH.
POST, Nov. 25, 1993, at A3.
50. Judy Rakowsky, Power Asks Judge to Reduce Sentence, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 12,
1994, at 59.
51. See Letter from Rikki J. Klieman, Esquire, to Hon. Nathaniel Gorton (Nov. 24, 1993)
(on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Journal) [hereinafter Letter].
52. Power, 650 N.E.2d at 90.
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Judicial Court of Massachusetts agreed that the probation conditions
imposed a content-based restriction on Power's speech.53 Nevertheless,
the court upheld the order, stating that the conditions need not survive
strict scrutiny, and were valid because the restraint on speech was
"reasonably related to a valid probation purpose. '54
The United States Supreme Court recently denied certiorari to
Power's appeal,55 thereby leaving open the question as to the appropriate
standard of review for court-imposed probation conditions that impinge on
First Amendment activity.
III. PROBATION CONDITIONS IN GENERAL
A. Purposes of Probation
Conceived as an alternative to incarceration, probation enables courts
to release defendants contingent upon certain conditions. 56 Similar to a
prison term, probation is a criminal sentence. Usually, probation is
imposed in lieu of a prison term.5 7 In Power's situation, however, the
court imposed a probation sentence to be served concurrently with her
prison sentence and beyond.5
8
Trial courts typically reflect on the dual goals of probation when
imposing probationary sentences-rehabilitation of the offender and
protection of the public.59 "These two goals ultimately amount to the
same thing: prevention of recidivism." 60 Rehabilitation prevents future
criminal behavior while simultaneously reducing the risk that the offender
poses to the public.61 This effort to prevent offenders from repeating the
same or other criminal acts is referred to as special deterrence. 62 Courts
53. Id. at 90.
54. Id. at 91.
55. Commonwealth v. Power, 116 S. Ct. 697 (1996).
56. ARTHuR W. CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING 100, 112 (2d ed. 1991).
57. Id. at 100.
58. Power, 650 N.E.2d at 89. One might question the court's motivation for dispensing
concurrent incarceration and probation. After all, probation conditions may not be "the vehicle
for circumvention of statutory sentencing limits." Higdon v. United States, 627 F.2d 893, 898
(9th Cir. 1980).
59. Commonwealth v. LaFrance, 525 N.E.2d 379, 383 (Mass. 1988).
60. Spencer, supra note 4, at 1215.
61. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScoTr, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 23
(1972).
62. SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES
149 (1989).
1996]
208 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17
accomplish special deterrence by imposing either prison terms or
probation sentences. 63 Imprisonment makes it virtually impossible for the
offender to commit another crime upon society, at least while the offender
is incarcerated. 64 Probation, on the other hand, attempts to modify the
probationer's behavior so that the probationer will not engage in further
criminal conduct.
65
B. Methods of Rehabilitation
Probation conditions designed to rehabilitate the offender often take
one of three forms: (1) modification of mental processes; (2) restriction of
physical activity; or (3) manipulation of social situations.66 The first form
is designed to assist the probationer in reforming thinking patterns that
may have previously engendered criminal activity.67 The second type of
rehabilitative probation focuses on the physical activity involved in the
crime. 68 Those convicted of drunk driving, for example, may be ordered
to refrain from drinking. 69 The third type of rehabilitative probation
condition is geared toward avoiding certain social situations that may have
prompted, and in fact encouraged, criminal activity. 70 For example,
according to one court, a probationer convicted of exporting guns to the
Irish Republican Army may be prohibited from associating with any Irish
or Irish Catholic associations.
71
In contrast, "general deterrence" attemps to prevent the greater public
from engaging in similar criminal conduct "insofar as the threat of
punishment deters potential offenders in the general community. '72
Critics of this reasoning are skeptical about the extent to which any form
of punishment actually deters future similar conduct. 73  Because
punishment of others is only one of several factors in the calculation, it is
difficult to accurately predict the deterrent effect of any one activity. 74
63. Spencer, supra note 4, at 1215.
64. Id. at 1215-16.
65. NEiL P. COHEN & JAMES J. GOBERT, THE LAW OF PROBATION AND PAROLE 183
(1983).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See Malone v. United States, 502 F.2d 554 (9th Cir. 1974); see also infra Part IV.B.2.b
for further discussion.
72. KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 62.
73. See LAFAVE & ScOrr, supra note 61, at 23.
74. Id.
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The nature of the offender's crime, for example, may affect the offender's
ability to be deterred.75 Those who commit crimes in the "heat of passion"
are less likely to be deterred by rational calculations of possible
punishment. 76 Similarly, social factors, including gender, education and
class, might dramatically alter the individual's calculations. 77 Thus, the
efficacy of probation as a method of general deterrence is greatly in
question.
When articulating the legitimate goals of probation, several courts
have distinguished general deterrence from notions of rehabilitation and
protection of the public. 78 In United States v. Abushaar,79 the Third
Circuit invalidated a probation condition because its only purpose was to
generally deter similar future conduct by others.80 The defendant was
convicted of making false statements to the Immigration and
Naturalization Service regarding his involvement in a scheme to
fraudulently obtain permanent residence status. 81 The defendant then
appealed his court-imposed probation condition requiring him to stay out
of the United States during his probation period.82 The government's sole
reason for the condition, according to the court, was to deter others from
committing similar offenses.83 The court concluded that although this
form of general deterrence is not necessarily invalid, probation conditions
must substantially serve the key purposes of probation-that is,
rehabilitation and the protection of the public in order to survive judicial
scrutiny.8
4
Following the lead of the Abushaar court, the Second Circuit further
refined the general deterrence/specific deterrence distinction in United
States v. Tolla.8 5 The defendant, a teacher, was convicted of making false
statements to the Internal Revenue Service.8 6 As part of her sentence, she
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See United States v. Tolla, 781 F.2d 29, 35 (2d Cir. 1986) (message to public was not a
proper justification for probation condition); United States v. Abushaar, 761 F.2d 954, 959 (3d
Cir. 1985) (invalidating condition that only served general deterrence because the condition was
not reasonably related to rehabilitation and protecting the public).
79. 761 F.2d 954 (3d Cir. 1985).
80. Id. at 958-59.
81. Id. at 954.
82. Id. at 955.
83. Id. at 958.
84. See id. at 959.
85. 781 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986).
86. Id. at 31.
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was barred from teaching students under the age of eighteen during her
probation.87  On appeal, the Second Circuit rejected the trial court's
premise that permitting a perjurer to teach young students would send a
bad message to the public. 88 The court reasoned that the trial judge's
sentence must properly reflect the goals of probation, not the message to
the public.8 9  Despite this rationale, the court upheld this particular
condition, reasoning that impressionable children would be protected from
the defendant's possible propensity for dishonesty.90 Thus, the court
further illustrated the inherent tension between general deterrence and both
rehabilitation and protection of the public.
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. General Probation Conditions
Although judges have broad discretion when shaping probation
conditions, 91 such conditions must serve the purposes of criminal law.
92
The test for validity of court-imposed probation conditions is whether they
are designed to meet the primary goals of probation: rehabilitation of the
offender and protection of the public. 93 An appellate court must begin any
review of probation conditions by considering whether the purpose behind
the trial court's imposition of the conditions is a permissible one. 94 Upon
finding a permissible purpose, the court must then consider whether the
impact of the conditions is "needlessly harsh," and therefore
impermissible.95
For example, in Higdon v. United States,96 the trial court had
required the defendant to forfeit all assets and perform three years of full-
87. Id. at 34.
88. Id. at 34-35.
89. Id. at 35.
90. Id.
91. See, e.g., United States v. Lowe, 654 F.2d 562, 567 (9th Cir. 1981); State v. Moses, 618
A.2d 478, 480 (Vt. 1992).
92. See, e.g., United States v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 144, 148 (5th Cir. 1979) ("The judge may,
in fact is obliged to, view probation as a substitute for imprisonment and formulate conditions
calculated to ensure that the probation furthers the purposes of the criminal law.").
93. Lowe, 654 F.2d at 567; United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 265 n.14
(9th Cir. 1975).
94. See, e.g., Higdon v. United States, 627 F.2d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 1980).
95. Id. at 898.
96. 627 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1980).
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time charity work as a condition of probation for his fraud conviction. 97
The defendant, an army sergeant, had defrauded the government of several
hundred thousand dollars while operating several clubs for
servicemembers in Vietnam. 98 The trial court suspended the defendant's
prison sentence as long as he abided by the conditions of probation set
forth by the court.99 These conditions required the defendant to forfeit all
of his assets, including his home, and to perform three years of full-time
unpaid charitable work. 100
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit invalidated the forfeiture and work
conditions as not "reasonably related" to the rehabilitation of the defendant
or the protection of the public. 1 1 The court stated that the permissible
purposes of probation are rehabilitation and protection of the public.
10 2
Thus, where the conditions do not reflect legitimate probationary purposes,
a court will generally invalidate the conditions.
Although a court's sentencing discretion is broad, it is generally
accepted that a court's discretion to fix conditions of probation is further
limited by basic standards of criminal law.' 0 3 For example, a court cannot
inflict probation restrictions that have been found to be improper
conditions of imprisonment or parole. 1' 4 Similarly, a court cannot impose
conditions that are "impossible or extremely difficult to satisfy,"' 1 5 or
conditons which are too vague to sufficiently guide the probationer.
106
B. Probation Conditions that Infringe on Constitutional Rights
The Supreme Court in Griffin v. Wisconsin10 7 recognized that a
probationer has a reduced liberty interest. The Court found that
probationers have "conditional liberty," depending on special probation
restrictions.108 Nonetheless, probationers retain a higher degree of liberty
97. Id. at 896.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 898.
102. Higdon, 627 F.2d at 897.
103. See United States v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 144, 148 (5th Cir. 1979).
104. United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1975). "[I]t is
virtually certain that those restraints that have been held improper when placed on prisoners and
parolees will also be unsuitable as probation conditions." Id.
105. CoHEN & GOBERT, supra note 65, at 209.
106. See People v. McDowell, 130 Cal. Rptr. 839, 843 (Ct. App. 1976) (finding that the
wording of the condition as imposed was "not sufficiently precise").
107. 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
108. Id. at 874 ("To a greater or lesser degree, it is always true of probationers ... that they
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than those who are formally incarcerated. 109 This probationer/prisoner
distinction has sparked debate over the extent to which probationers should
be accorded constitutional rights." 10
Many probation conditions implicate constitutional rights in their
mission to promote the rehabilitation of probationers and the protection of
the public. And although a probationer may have only conditional liberty
interests, these rights are not absolutely eliminated. 111 Rehabilitation, as
often noted, cannot successfully occur unless there is real change within
the offender. 112 Given the rehabilitative goals of probation, constitutional
interests should be protected to the greatest extent possible. A penal
system without a firm commitment to the fundamental concerns articulated
in the Bill of Rights undermines its own attempt to adjust lawless
behavior. "There is no better way to ensure that probation meets its goals
of rehabilitation and protecting the public than to provide this opportunity
for the offender to become a law-abiding member of society."" 13
1. Probation Restrictions Involving Fundamental Rights
Probation conditions that restrict fundamental rights (as opposed to
merely articulated liberties) are subject to even more careful review. 114 If
those conditions are not designed to aid in rehabilitating the probationer or
protecting the public, they will be invalidated. 115
Commonwealth v. LaFrance116 illustrates one such situation. In
LaFrance, the court rejected a probation condition that permitted a
"blanket threat of warrantless searches."117  After pleading guilty to
burglary and larceny charges, LaFrance "received a suspended sentence
do not enjoy 'the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only ... conditional
liberty properly dependent on observance of special [probation] restrictions."' (citations
omitted)).
109. See Stacey L. Arthur, The Norplant Prescription: Birth Control, Woman Control, or
Crime Control?, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1, 60 (1992). "Probationers and parolees walk an interesting
line. They dwell among the public with whom they share many of the guarantees of the Bill of
Rights, but they remain subject to the strictures of the criminal justice system." Id.
110. See id.
111. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 1-3.
112. See EDGARDO RoTMAN, BEYOND PUNISHMENT: A NEW VIEW ON THE
REHABILITATION OF CRIMNAL OFFENDERS 8 (1990) (noting that significant change will come
only from the individual's own insight).
113. Jaimy M. Levine, Comment, "Join the Sierra Club! ": Imposition of Ideology as a
Condition of Probation, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1841, 1860 (1994).
114. United States v. Terrigno, 838 F.2d 371, 374 (9th Cir. 1988).
115. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. LaFrance, 525 N.E.2d 379, 383 (Mass. 1988).
116. Id.
117. Id.
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with probation for two years." 1 8 After violating her initial probation, the
defendant was confined to a corrections home and then again released on
probation, subject to new provisions. 119 The special conditions imposed
by the judge required the defendant to "[s]ubmit to any search ... with or
without a search warrant, ... [at] the request of a probation officer."'120
After examining the U.S. Supreme Court's treatment of warrantless
searches, the appellate court concluded that "[u]pholding the warrant
requirements [of reasonable suspicion] for searches of the probationer's
home does not impede the dual goals of probation, protecting the public
and rehabilitation."'12 1 Thus, where probation conditions interfere with the
probationer's fundamental right to be free of unreasonable searches and
seizures, the conditions must be "necessary" to serve the goals of
probation if they are to be valid. 122
2. Probation Restrictions Involving Freedom of Expression
It is well-established that probationers may be subject to restrictions
that would be impermissible if applied to the general public. 123 However,
lower courts are divided over the application of this general rule to
restrictions of First Amendment rights. 124 A number of courts adhere to
the rule that content-based restrictions on speech always trigger the
strictest scrutiny. 125 Other courts have upheld conditions restricting First
Amendment activities where the conditions were "reasonably related" to
the purposes of probation. 126
In a related context, the Supreme Court has suggested that the
appropriate level of review for such content-based speech restrictions
118. Id. at 380.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 380 n.2.
121. LaFrance, 525 N.E.2d at 383 (citations omitted).
122. Id.
123. See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74 (1987); United States v.
Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1975) (en banc) (holding that probationers are
subject to limitations that are inapplicable to ordinary persons).
124. Compare In re Mannino, 92 Cal. Rptr. 880 (Ct. App. 1971) with United States v.
Terrigno, 838 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1988) and United States v. Waxman, 638 F. Supp. 1245 (E.D.
Pa. 1986).
125. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2459 (1994); Simon &
Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115-18 (1991);
Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991).
126. See United States v. Terrigno, 838 F.2d 371, 374 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Waxman, 638 F. Supp. 1245 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
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would be an intermediate level of scrutiny. 127 The Court reasoned, in
Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.,128 that precisely because judicial
orders are directed toward particular individuals, injunctions restraining
speech "carry greater risks of censorship and discriminatory
application,"'129 and must be measured by more rigorous tests than their
legislative counterparts. 130 Although Part V of this Note contains a more
in-depth discussion of the argument for intermediate scrutiny, the
following section is devoted to comparing the two competing standards of
review-strict scrutiny and rational basis.
a. Strict Scrutiny
A number of federal and state courts have held that probation
conditions infringing on constitutionally protected rights are subject to
"special scrutiny," 131 and must be "fine-tuned" to probationary goals
closely related to the crime. 132 Where "conditions that restrict freedom of
expression extend beyond preventing recidivism, courts [have narrowly
tailored] the conditions or eliminate[d] them completely."' 133 For example,
in In re Mannino,134 the California Court of Appeal invalidated probation
conditions that barred the defendant from speaking or writing about
political issues and also prohibited his passive membership in political
organizations. 13 5 Yet, the court upheld the condition forbidding "active"
participation in political demonstrations. 136
Mannino was convicted of assault during a political
demonstration. 137 The court reasoned that written political speech was
only tenuously connected to Mannino's criminal acts and suggested
nothing about his recidivism. 138 "Petitioner's writing, albeit in protest of
127. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2524 (1994).
128. 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
129. Id. at 2524.
130. Id.
131. United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1975); see also
Sobell v. Reed, 327 F. Supp. 1294, 1303 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (holding that such conditions must be
"tested by 'stringent standards' and subjected to 'rigid scrutiny' (quoting Jackson v. Godwin,
400 F.2d 529, 541 (5th Cir. 1968))).
132. United States v. Smith, 972 F.2d 960, 961 (8th Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v.
Tolla, 781 F.2d 29, 34 (2d Cir. 1986)).
133. Spencer, supra note 4, at 1228.
134. 92 Cal. Rptr. 880 (Ct. App. 1971).
135. Id. at 886-87.
136. Id. at 888.
137. Id. at 885.
138. See id. at 886.
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or for a change of [] existing conditions, does not appear to have any direct
relationship to the crime of which he was convicted, nor has it been shown
to have any effect on his future criminality."' 139 Consequently, the court
invalidated the provision because it unduly violated Mannino's
constitutional rights. 140 In contrast, the court reasoned that Mannino's
active participation in political demonstrations was directly linked to his
past criminal conduct and would likely increase his propensity to continue
such behavior. 141 Accordingly, the court held that the prohibition against
active participation in demonstrations was valid. 142 Hence, the court
upheld certain restrictions on the freedom of expression, but invalidated
other conditions "insofar as they were unrelated to preventing recidivism
by the probationer."'
143
The tension between preventing recidivism and restraining free
expression is further illustrated in Porth v. Templar. 144 Porth, an avid anti-
tax advocate, was convicted of tax evasion. 145 After serving his sentence,
he was placed on probation prohibiting him from "circulating ... materials
... questioning the constitutionality of the Federal Reserve System and the
Federal Income Tax laws .... ,,146 On appeal, Porth sought to invalidate
these conditions. 147  "[I]n the abstract," the court noted, the speech
restriction "appears to prohibit conduct which is not per se harmful. To
muzzle the appellant to this extent is on its face a violation of his First
Amendment freedom of expression." 148 Although a defendant "forfeits
much of his freedom of action and even freedom of expression," it is only
"to the extent necessary to successful rehabilitation and protection of the
public .... 149 Because there was neither public danger from his anti-tax
crusade, nor a probability that his speech would result in further criminal
conduct on his part, the conditions prohibiting such protest speech were
invalid. 150  Nonetheless, the court stated that insofar as any of the
defendant's speech was "designed to urge or encourage others to violate
139. Id. at 886.
140. In re Mannino, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 886-87.
141. Id. at 887.
142. Id.
143. Spencer, supra note 4, at 1228.
144. 453 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1971).
145. Id. at 332.
146. Id. at 332 n.1.
147. Id. at 331.
148. Id. at 334.
149. Id.
150. See Porth, 453 F.2d at 334.
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the laws, the condition [was] valid."15 1 Here, the restriction clearly relates
to the protection of the public by minimizing unlawful conduct. Implicit
in the court's decision is the distinction between restricting expression for
the purpose of rehabilitation or protection of the public and restricting
expression beyond the traditional goals of probationary sentences.
b. Reasonable Relationship
A majority of courts have upheld probation conditions restricting
First Amendment activities where the conviction was for a crime
committed during the course of expressive activity and the conditions were
"reasonably related" to the goals of the probationary sentence. When
former Congressmember Richard Tonry violated election laws, the court
upheld a probation condition barring Tonry from participating in electoral
politics. 152 Following a grand jury investigation of alleged violations of
the Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA"), Tonry pled guilty to four
counts, including conspiracy to violate the FECA, acceptance of a political
contribution in excess of FECA limits, and promising benefits in exchange
for political contributions. 153  Upon his release from prison, Tonry
appealed the probation conditions as violative of his First Amendment
right to engage in political activity. 154 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the
condition was "tailored to advance both the purposes of the federal
election statute and the purposes of the probation act: rehabilitation and
protection of the public."'155 The Fifth Circuit added, "Tonry will be
deprived of some of his constitutional rights while under probation, but
this deprivation is appropriate to the nature of his crimes."' 156 Thus, the
court found that the conditions of probation were reasonably related to the
general goals of probation and were therefore permissible.1
5 7
Applying the same form of analysis, a defendant convicted of a drug
offense was prohibited from associating with others convicted of drug
offenses as a term of his probation. 158 Similarly, a probationer convicted
of exporting guns for the Irish Republican Army was barred from
151. Id.
152. United States v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 144, 146, 150-51 (5th Cir. 1979). "[I]t was intended
that defendant not run for political office nor engage in any political activity, be it federal, state,
local, municipal or parochial, during the period of probation." Id. at 146.
153. Id. at 146.
154. Id. at 146-47.
155. Id. at 150-51.
156. Id. at 151.
157. Id.
158. United States v. Romero, 676 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1982).
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associating with any Irish or Irish Catholic organizations, participating in
the American Irish Republican movement, and visiting Irish pubs. 1
59
Massachusetts joins the majority of courts which apply a weaker
standard, requiring only that the probation condition be reasonably related
to the general aims of the criminal justice system. 160 Consequently, the
ruling in Power "contributes to a growing dispute among the lower courts
about the extent to which those convicted of crime may be subjected to
otherwise unconstitutional restrictions on fundamental rights."'
161
3. Probation Conditions Involving
Financial Disincentives
Two other lower courts have dealt with probation restrictions similar
to the type imposed in Power.162 In United States v. Waxman, 163 the court
rejected the defendant's request to modify probation conditions barring
him from profiting financially from commercial depiction of his criminal
conduct. 164 Waxman, an art connoisseur, pled guilty to receiving stolen
property in connection with numerous art thefts. 165  In response to
Waxman's impermissible purpose challenge, the judge stated, "I imposed
this restriction on Dr. Waxman, not to punish him, but to restrict his ability
to profit from his own wrongdoing."'1 66 The court suggested that the
sentence was designed to demonstrate that crime does not pay: "[N]ot only
may they have to pay the piper but that they cannot expect the piper to pay
them for their memoirs."'167 In response to Waxman's First Amendment
claim, the court held that the restriction did not bar him from "speak[ing]
to whom he wishes[,] ... only ... that he [may] not be paid for doing
159. Malone v. United States, 502 F.2d 554, 555 (9th Cir. 1974).
160. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 787 F.2d 1182 (7th Cir. 1986) (drug screening
condition related to defendant's crime of possessing stolen mail and forging government
checks); Edwards v. State, 327 S.E.2d 559 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985) (condition banishing probationer
from judicial circuit); State v. Miller, 499 N.W.2d 215, 217 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (condition
related only to prior crimes).
161. See Petition for Cert. at 4, Commonwealth v. Power, 650 N.E.2d 87 (Mass. 1995),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 697 (1996).
162. See Spencer, supra note 4, at 1229.
163. 638 F. Supp. 1245 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
164. Id. at 1246.
165. Id. at 1245.
166. Id. at 1246.
167. Id.; see also Spencer, supra note 4, at 1235 (suggesting that crime itself does not pay,
publicity does).
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so."' 168 The court ultimately found the "probation-condition rehabilitative
in nature, deterrent in effect, . . . reasonable" 169 and therefore valid.
Similarly, in United States v. Terrigno,170 the Ninth Circuit rejected
a challenge to a probation condition that barred the defendant from
profiting from any commercialization of her criminal acts. 171 After a jury
convicted Terrigno of embezzlement and conversion of public funds from
a federally funded counseling center where she was executive director, the
court sentenced Terrigno to a community treatment center and
probation.172 The probation term specified "[t]hat the defendant, during
the period of probation, not receive any financial remuneration ... from
any speaking engagements, written publications, movies, or any other
media coverage dealing with her involvement in this offense."' 173
Terrigno appealed the probation condition contending it violated her
First Amendment rights. 174 On review, the appellate court determined that
the condition did not restrict Terrigno's right to speak, but merely her
ability to profit by exploiting her story. 175 The court determined that the
profit restriction would aid in Terrigno's rehabilitation by sending her a
message that "crime does not pay." 176 As a result, the appellate court
found that the restriction on profit by selling a crime story was reasonably
related to Terrigno's rehabilitation and was therefore permissible.177
Critics contend that the Waxman and Terrigno cases can be
significantly distinguished from Power.178 Both the Waxman and Terrigno
decisions precede the Supreme Court's ruling in Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
Members of the New York State Crime Victims Board, 179 which held that
financial disincentives upon content-based speech inherently violate the
freedom of expression guaranteed by the First Amendment. 180 In Simon &
Schuster, the court reasoned that financial burdens, by their very nature,
serve as disincentives to speech. 181 Additionally, critics have suggested
168. Waxman, 638 F. Supp. at 1246.
169. Id. at 1247.
170. 838 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1988).
171. Id. at 373-74.
172. Id. at 373.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 374.
175. Id.
176. Terrigno, 838 F.2d at 374.
177. Id.
178. See Spencer, supra note 4, at 1234.
179. 502 U.S. 105 (1991).
180. Id. at 117.
181. Id. at 116.
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that these cases can be distinguished on other grounds. Because Power's
probation condition runs concurrent to her prison term, the trial court
manipulated the probation sentence to add further punishment to the
defendant.
182
V. THE CASE FOR INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY
In light of the analytical divergence among the lower courts on this
issue, the Supreme Court's recent holding in Madsen may provide a more
workable standard of review-intermediate scrutiny. Although the
Madsen Court addressed restraining orders on anti-abortion protesters
rather than probationers, the Court's reasoning clearly applies: because
judicial orders direct their commands toward particular individuals,
injunctions restraining speech "carry greater risks of censorship and
discriminatory application."' 183 Applying intermediate scrutiny could limit
those risks and properly curtail the effect of improper probation
conditions.
A. Madsen as a Case Study
Madsen involved a challenge to an injunction restraining anti-
abortion protesters from demonstrating within certain limits of a local
women's clinic. 184 The Court rejected the claim that the injunction was
content-based solely because it singled out anti-abortion protesters.' 8 5
Anti-abortion protesters, the Court reasoned, were the only individuals
engaged in the unlawful conduct. Because the injunction was directed at
the effect of the protests, not their substance, the injunction was not subject
to traditional strict scrutiny.186 Nor was it subject to the most lenient level
of review. 187
The Court explained that the disparity between injunctions and
generally applicable ordinances warranted an application of heightened
182. Spencer, supra note 4, at 1235. "[T]he only apparent purpose of putting Power on
probation while she is in prison is to create a situation in which the Probation Department acts
as her censor." Brief for Appellant at 20 n.13, Commonwealth v. Power, 650 N.E.2d 87 (Mass.
1995) (No. 93-P-1755), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 697 (1996). "The Commonwealth knows where
Power is and what she is doing while incarcerated. The only function the probation officer can
serve during the years Power is in prison is as censor-enforcer of the prior restraint." Id.
183. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2524 (1994).
184. Id. at 2521.
185. Id. at 2523.
186. Id. at 2524.
187. Id.
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scrutiny. 188 "Ordinances represent a legislative choice regarding the
promotion of particular societal interests. Injunctions, by contrast, are
[societal] remedies imposed for [specific] violations (or threatened
violations) of a legislative or judicial decree." 189  The Court further
declared that injunctions also "carry greater risks of censorship."'190 Yet,
the Court did not entirely disregard the advantages of injunctions over
generally applicable statutes. Injunctions can be both narrowly tailored
and offer more precise relief.191 After balancing these concerns, the Court
determined that the differences between court-ordered injunctions and
generally applicable statutes "require a somewhat more stringent
application of general First Amendment principles.... " 19
2
Nonetheless, the Court refused to apply strict scrutiny, contending
that the injunction was neither content nor viewpoint based. 193 Although
the injunction did regulate the activities of a particular group, including
their speech activities, the injunction was directed only at the effects of
their conduct within a specific dispute, not at the contents of their
message. 1
94
Ultimately, the standard articulated by the Court represents a
compromise approach. 195 "We must ask instead whether the challenged
provisions of the injunction burden no more speech than necessary to serve
a significant government interest."' 196
Applying an intermediate level of scrutiny, the Court identified three
significant state interests compelling the injunction: (1) the protection of
women's rights to medical or counseling services; (2) public safety; and
(3) residential privacy. 197 The thirty-six foot "buffer zone" at clinic
entrances was held to be substantially related to promoting each of the
goals articulated. 198  The noise restrictions were also upheld as
188. Id.
189. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2524.
190. Id.
191. Id. (citing United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 183 (1987)).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 2524.
194. Id.
195. See Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2525. Justice Stevens argued for a rational basis type of
analysis. See id. at 2531-32. Justice Scalia, on the other hand, argued for strict scrutiny. Id. at
2538. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, set the standard at the intermediate level
of scrutiny. Id. at 2525.
196. Id. at 2525.
197. Id. at 2526. In Madsen, residential privacy was analogized to medical privacy. Id.
198. Id. at 2527.
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substantially related. 199 Yet, the Court invalidated the portions of the
injunction that banned "images [that were] observable," 200 and created
both a thirty-six foot "buffer zone" around the clinic itself, and a 300-foot
"no approach zone" around the clinic and the private homes of the clinic
staff.201 The Court held these portions to be broader than necessary to
achieve the goals of the state.
202
B. The Relationship Between Injunctions and Probation
The concerns the Court identified regarding court-ordered injunctions
are equally applicable to court-ordered probation conditions. Similar to a
court-ordered injunction, probation is directed toward a specific defendant
and is designed to remedy a specific problem. Moreover, the possibility
that a judicial decree will "carry greater risks of censorship" 20 3 is equally
possible with judicially-mandated probation sentences. Furthermore, what
makes injunctions particularly suspect is the effect of the collateral bar
rule, a rule equally applicable to probation structures. Consequently, the
intermediate level of scrutiny applied to injunctions should similarly be
applied when reviewing court-ordered probation conditions.
C. Problems of Prior Restraint
Interestingly, the Court in Madsen refused to apply a "prior restraint"
analysis to the injunction. 2°4 Although injunctions often take the form of
prior restraints on constitutionally protected speech, 20 5 "[n]ot all
injunctions which may incidentally affect expression ... are 'prior
restraints.' "206 In Madsen, the anti-abortion protesters were not restrained
from communicating their ideas entirely; they were permitted to express
themselves in other areas throughout the community.20 7 Additionally, the
Court noted that the injunction was not issued because of the content of the
protesters' expression, but rather because of their prior unlawful
conduct.20
8
199. Id. at 2528.
200. Id. at 2529.
201. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2529-30.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 2524.
204. Id. at 2524 n.2.
205. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
206. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2524 n.2.
207. Id.
208. Id.
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A claim that Power's probation conditions constitute a prior restraint
would likely fall prey to similar arguments. Power's attorneys argued that
the probation conditions functioned as a prior restraint because the order
"requires Power to have her speech pre-approved by her probation officer
... [with] unfettered discretion .... [and] the authority to threaten Power
with ... life imprisonment[] for any perceived violation." 20 9  This
argument, however, is not entirely supportable. The probation condition
itself does not prevent Power from re-telling her story; it merely bars
financial compensation for any re-telling. Also, like the prohibition issued
against anti-abortion protesters in Madsen, the restriction in Power was
issued not because of the content of her potential speech, but because of
Power's prior unlawful conduct. Nevertheless, the position of the
probation officer as arbiter may indeed teeter on the edge of impermissible
prior restraints.
D. Problems of Financial Burdens: Simon & Schuster Concerns
Problems of prior restraint, however, are not the only forms of speech
restrictions. The Court has noted that the government need not completely
prohibit speech in order to restrict freedom of expression. 210 Imposing a
financial burden on speech based on its content is presumptively
inconsistent with the First Amendment. 211 In Simon & Schuster, the Court
invalidated New York's "Son of Sam" law. The statute required anyone
contracting with a person accused or convicted of a crime, with respect to
telling his or her story in the media, to place all profits received in an
escrow account. The Crime Victims Board was then responsible for
distributing such profits to the victims.212 The Court determined that the
"[s]tate has a compelling interest in ensuring that victims of crime are
compensated by those who harm them." 213
Nevertheless, the Court found that the "Son of Sam" law was
"overinclusive," and therefore inconsistent with the First Amendment. 214
Specifically, the statute applied to works on any subject expressing the
author's thoughts or recollections about her crime, however tangentially or
209. Petition for Cert. at 4-5, Commonwealth v. Power, 650 N.E.2d 87 (Mass. 1995), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 697 (1996).
210. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105, 115-16 (1991).
211. Id. at 115.
212. Id. at 109.
213. Id. at 118.
214. Id. at 121-23.
A PENNY FOR YOUR THOUGHTS
incidentally related. 215  In addition, the statute's broad definition of
"person convicted of a crime" cast too wide a sweep, according to the
Court.216 "Had the Son of Sam law been in effect at the time and place of
publication, it would have escrowed payment for such works as The
Autobiography of Malcolm X, ... [Henry Thoreau's] Civil Disobedience
... and even the Confessions of Saint Augustine."217 Thus, as a method of
ensuring that victims are compensated from the indirect proceeds of crime,
the Court found the "Son of Sam" law to be "significantly
overinclusive."
218
The Simon & Schuster Court suggests that, in today's marketplace,
money and speech cannot be separated. "In the context of financial
regulation, it bears repeating ... that the government's ability to impose
content-based burdens on speech raises the specter that the government
may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the
marketplace." 219 The Court continued:
[t]he constitutional right of free expression is ... intended to
remove governmental restraints from the arena of public
discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced
largely in to the hands of each of us ... in the belief that no
other approach would comport with the premise of individual
dignity and choice upon which our political system rests.2
20
Following this logic, no financial burden would be permissible.
E. Financial Burdens on Katherine Ann Power
Similar to the conditions set forth in New York's "Son of Sam" law,
the probation conditions placed on Katherine Ann Power prohibit her from
profiting by selling her story.221 The condition imposes a serious financial
burden on speech of a specified content-anything related to her crime,
her life as a fugitive, or her decision to turn herself in. 222 By doing so, the
probation condition operates as a disincentive to speech. Consequently,
like any other content-based speech restriction, this condition violates her
215. Id. at 121; Spencer, supra note 4, at 1225.
216. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 121.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 116.
220. Id. at 116 (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971)).
221. Commonwealth v. Power, 650 N.E.2d 87, 89 (Mass. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
697 (1996).
222. Id.
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First Amendment right to free expression. 223  Any restriction of a
fundamental right warrants a more careful analysis than the mere
reasonable relationship level of review.
224
F. The Problem of "Reasonable" Scrutiny
According to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, however,
such a restriction need only survive a single, relatively insignificant
hurdle: that it be "reasonably related to a legitimate purpose of criminal
sentencing." 225 Such restrictions are, in fact, self-justifying. Prohibiting
probationers from speaking for compensation, the Massachusetts court
concluded, is always permissible because it reinforces "the moral
foundations of our society.
'226
In its final analysis, the Massachusetts court employed the same
reasoning that has continually motivated government censors: a desire to
shape public opinion by targeting and burdening disfavored speakers.
That is flatly contrary to constitutional values, and that is why
content-based restrictions always trigger strict scrutiny. To
hold, as the Massachusetts court did, that probationers' speech
may be restricted on the basis of its content because of a judicial
judgment that society is better off without that speech, is to
deny those speakers the very core protection of the First
Amendment. 2
27
Here, the court has broadly taken aim at particular protected speech
with the explicit purpose of suppressing it on the basis of content. The
probation conditions neither impose a "time, place, or manner
restriction, '228 nor are their effects limited to speech in non-public
forums.2 2 9 The conditions, as drafted, impose a general ban on any
compensated speech by Power related to her past criminal conduct.230
223. See Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 116.
224. See infra Part V.F.
225. Power, 650 N.E.2d at 91.
226. Id.
227. Petition for Cert. at 10, Commonwealth v. Power, 650 N.E.2d 87 (Mass. 1995), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 697 (1996).
228. Time, place, or manner restrictions merely limit the delivery of speech, not its
substantive content. Cf. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983)
(teachers' organization, other than elected bargaining representatives, barred from using school
mailboxes to communicate with teachers).
229. Cf. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992)
(holding that an airport designed for public travel was not a public forum for religious speech).
230. Power, 650 N.E.2d at 89.
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Inasmuch as the probation conditions in Power are aimed at protected
speech and discriminate on the basis of content, they are invalid regardless
of whether Massachusetts can present a "compelling interest. ' 231 As
Justice Kennedy articulated, weighing free speech rights against the state's
interest in content-based suppression of speech is "unnecessary and
incorrect," because a "resort to [that] might be read as a concession that
States may censor speech whenever they believe there is a compelling
justification for doing so. Our precedents and traditions allow no such
inference." 232 As the Supreme Court stated, "the government may not
regulate [speech] based on hostility--or favoritism-towards the
underlying message expressed.
'233
Thus, the question becomes: why should courts apply a rigorous
standard of review when analyzing a legislative action that violates a
fundamental right and yet apply a less stringent standard when analyzing a
judicial action involving a fundamental right?234 Moreover, this inquiry
reflects the larger question of whether morality is a sufficient basis for
restricting First Amendment freedoms at all. Because morality is so
inherently subjective, and therefore capable of discriminatory application,
the appropriate standard of review for courts reviewing probation
conditions should be one of intermediate scrutiny.
G. The Problem of Strict Scrutiny
Critics argue that the highest standards of scrutiny simply provide
probationers with the same level of constitutional protection as
nonprobationers. 235  Clearly, this is a legitimate critique. Those who
engage in unlawful activity should forfeit some of the constitutional
protections generally provided. How else do we as a society regulate
criminal activity but confine the most harmful of criminals to government-
run facilities?
231. Petition for Cert. at 11, Commonwealth v. Power, 650 N.E.2d 87 (Mass. 1995), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 697 (1996).
232. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105, 124-25 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
233. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 401 (1992).
234. For a similar argument, see State v. Friberg, 435 N.W.2d 509, 520 n.6 (Minn. 1989)
(Popovich, J., dissenting). "I cannot understand why the trial court's decision in this case
should receive a lesser standard of scrutiny than the legislative acts of Congress ... or the State
." Id.
235. See Thomas E. Bartrum, Note, Birth Control as a Condition of Probation-A New
Weapon in the War Against Child Abuse, 80 KY. L.J. 1037, 1045 (1992).
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Where fundamental constitutional rights are concerned, an
infringement should be allowed only when necessary to meet a compelling
or substantial state interest. Indeed, the probationer is not off "scot-free."
Probation conditions properly impose on the probationer a list of duties
and responsibilities. Moreover, the state's compelling interests in
rehabilitation and public safety adequately ensure a distinction between
permissible infringements upon the constitutional rights of probationers
and impermissible infringements upon the constitutional rights of
nonprobationers.
H. Intermediate Scrutiny: A Possible Solution
Echoing the Court's logic in Madsen, an intermediate level of
scrutiny should apply to probation conditions that jeopardize First
Amendment rights, particularly the right of free expression. Such a
standard would appropriately balance the multiple interests at stake: the
rehabilitation and deterrence interests, as well as the larger societal
interests of promoting free speech and guarding against governmental
censorship even when the speech in question is inimical to the values
society wants to encourage. As is often stated, perhaps the best way to
personally censor objectionable speech is to ignore it.23 6
VI. INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY As APPLIED TO KATHERINE ANN POWER
The Massachusetts court's lenient review of Power's probation
condition ignores the Court's more recent elucidation of an intermediate
standard of review in Madsen. Applying intermediate scrutiny, the
condition imposed on Power would impermissibly restrict her freedom of
expression.
236. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976).
There is, of course, an alternative to this highly paternalistic approach. That
alternative is to assume that this information is not in itself harmful, that people
will perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough informed, and
that the best means to that end is to open the channels of communication rather
than to close them.
Id. Because Virginia State Board explored commercial advertising, arguably this line of
thinking is inapplicable to the present case. However, the argument itself is a general one
commonly used in First Amendment cases. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,
745-46 (1978).
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A. Governmental Interests
What is the compelling governmental interest in freezing Power's
expressive activity? Power's expression is neither a threat to society nor
would it create an immediate danger to the community. Her words alone
could not compel violence or lawless activity. In fact, Power's own
repudiation of her life in hiding implies that any commercialization of her
life story would discourage, not glorify, unlawful conduct.
Power has ably demonstrated her own rehabilitation by turning
herself in to authorities.237 She does not deny responsibility, and she has
expressed remorse for the acts she committed and the pain she caused
others.2
38
To the extent that the state has an interest in punishment, Power is
both in prison and on probation. There is no legal basis for stifling
expression as a method of punishment. Indeed, the core of First
Amendment protection is that society benefits from a vigorous
marketplace of ideas, and we are all diminished when any voice is stilled
by government. 239 Both public discourse and literature are replete with
writings of prisoners and ex-prisoners. 240
Arguably, the important governmental interest at stake is in
compensating victims of crime for the losses they endure. 24 1  If
compensation is so important, how does conditioning Power's speech
reflect and indeed further this important governmental interest? In this
case, ironically, the conditions actually bar the victims of crime from
receiving any form of financial compensation for their losses.242 Despite
Power's intimations that she would remunerate the Schroeder family, the
conditions of her probation limit her from doing so. 243
237. Carlson, supra note 8, at 62.
238. Id.
239. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 745-46.
240. The Supreme Court has noted the writings of former prisoners Emma Goldman,
Martin Luther King, Jr., and Henry David Thoreau in a similar vein. See Simon & Schuster, 502
U.S. at 121-22. Beyond those, the views from imprisoned labor organizers such as Eugene
Debs as well as the participants in the Watergate scandal (including John Ehrlichman, Jeb Stuart
Magruder and H.R. Haldeman) have been published. In fact, Patricia Hearst has written a
chronicle of her life, as has Margaret Sanger.
241. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 118 (noting that the state's interest in
compensating victims from the fruits of crime is compelling).
242. See Letter, supra note 51.
243. Id.
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Finally, to the extent that the government has an interest in generally
deterring others from committing similar crimes, the argument is flawed.
The premise for such an argument rests upon the following logic:
There must be a number of people who will decide to commit
crimes if Power is allowed to sell her story. These criminals
must then plan crimes with the goal of getting caught, and with
the further goal of generating enough publicity to reap
substantial book or movie royalties. Finally, the criminals must
hope to receive short enough prison sentences to one day enjoy
their royalties.
244
Such foolish logic could not possibly support such restrictions on
Power's freedom of expression. Indeed, assuming that the government
could and should control the content of speech, is this not a story that
should be told? Power has expressed her remorse and her reluctance to
glorify her past life as a fugitive. After all, she voluntarily turned herself
in to authorities when concealment of her prior activities had been entirely
successful. Thus, none of the potential compelling state interests provided
offer sufficient justification for the total prohibition of Power's free
expression.
B. The Nexus Between Interests and Means
Intermediate scrutiny requires that the government activity in
question be substantially related to an important government interest.245
Assuming, for the sake of argument, these articulated interests are valid,
do the means used by the Power court substantially relate to these goals?
The condition, as drafted, is a feeble attempt at protecting the public
from Power's criminal conduct because it bears no relation to the societal
dangers of armed robbery. After all, Officer Schroeder was shot by a gun,
not by a book.
In terms of her own rehabilitation, Power voluntarily turned herself
over to the authorities. Since she has fully accepted responsibility for her
actions, it is unclear how discouraging her from telling her story will
contribute to her rehabilitation. She did not commit the crime for
pecuniary gain, so it is difficult to discern a substantial relationship
between restraining her profitable speech and reforming her criminal
character. Moreover, there is no evidence that she has participated in any
other dangerous or anti-social behavior that would be corrected by speech
244. Spencer, supra note 4, at 1232-33.
245. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2525 (1994).
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restrictions. Stifling expression is a questionable method of punishment,
yet clearly denying Power a property interest in the sale of her story
significantly contributes to her punishment.
As demonstrated above, conditioning Power's speech does not
substantially further the interest in compensating victims of crime. The
restriction placed on Power actually works to the detriment of these crime
victims. Power was eager to share any proceeds of her story with the
Schroeder family, but this condition prohibited her from doing S0.246
Finally, the probation condition placed on Power fails to relate
sufficiently to the government interest in generally deterring similar
criminal conduct. To support such an argument, one would have to make
some rather implausible assumptions: primarily, that individuals will see
Power's story as a suggestion to commit crimes in order to sell one's own
narrative upon release from jail.247 With only a tenuous relationship
between the interests and the means, Power's probation restrictions
inherently violate the protections guaranteed under the First Amendment
and should thus be stricken.
VII. CONCLUSION
Court-imposed probation conditions directed toward particular
individuals carry great risks of censorship and discriminatory application.
Similar to legislative actions that implicate fundamental rights, judicial
actions should be subject to exacting scrutiny so as to limit those risks and
properly balance the interests at stake. Adopting the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Madsen, an intermediate level of scrutiny should apply to
probation conditions that work to limit First Amendment rights. Under
this standard, the conditions imposed on Katherine Ann Power would not
survive judicial scrutiny and therefore impermissibly restrict her freedom
of expression.
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